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Background: Deforestation due to tobacco farming began to raise concerns in the mid 1970s. Over the next
40 years, tobacco growing increased significantly and shifted markedly to low- and middle-income countries.
The percentage of deforestation caused by tobacco farming reached 4 % globally by the early 2000s, although
substantially higher in countries such as China (18 %), Zimbabwe (20 %), Malawi (26 %) and Bangladesh
(>30 %). Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have argued that tobacco-attributable deforestation is not a
serious problem, and that the industry has addressed the issue through corporate social responsibility (CSR)
initiatives.
Methods: After reviewing the existing scholarly literature on tobacco and deforestation, we analysed industry
sources of public information to understand how the industry framed deforestation, its key causes, and policy
responses. To analyse industry strategies between the 1970s and early 2000s to shape understanding of
deforestation caused by tobacco farming and curing, the Truth Tobacco Documents Library was systematically
searched. The above sources were compiled and triangulated, thematically and chronologically, to derive a
narrative of how the industry has framed the problem of, and solutions to, tobacco-attributable deforestation.
Results: The industry sought to undermine responses to tobacco-attributable deforestation by emphasising the
economic benefits of production in LMICs, blaming alternative causes, and claiming successful forestation
efforts. To support these tactics, the industry lobbied at the national and international levels, commissioned
research, and colluded through front groups. There was a lack of effective action to address tobacco-
attributable deforestation, and indeed an escalation of the problem, during this period.
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Conclusions: The findings suggest the need for independent data on the varied environmental impacts of the
tobacco industry, awareness of how the industry seeks to work with environmental researchers and groups to
further its interests, and increased scrutiny of tobacco industry efforts to influence environmental policy.
Keywords: Tobacco industry, Leaf farming, Deforestation, Policy influence, Corporate social responsibilityIntroduction
Deforestation is the process whereby natural forests
are cleared through logging and/or burning, either to
use the timber or the area for alternative uses [1].
Around 1.5 billion hectares of forests, mainly tropical
forests, have been lost since the 1970s [2], causing up
to 30 % of greenhouse gas emissions annually [3]. To-
bacco farming and curing constitute a “proximate
cause” of deforestation due to forest removal for agri-
cultural land, soil nutrient depletion and wood fuel
usage [4]. Concerns about tobacco-attributable defor-
estation began to be raised in the mid 1970s [5],
spurred by a 128 % increase in production in low-
and middle-income countries (LMICs) [6], and 40 %
increase globally from 1971 to 1997 [7]. Geist [8]
(p. 18) estimated that, during the mid 1980s, “Virginia
(flue-cured) tobacco consume[d] between 82.5 and
175 million cubic metres of roundwood harvested
worldwide each year for curing…the equivalent of
1.2–2.5 million hectares of open forests or woodlands
removed annually”. However, the problem continued
unabated. Available data suggests tobacco caused 4 %
of deforestation globally [9], but was a significant
cause of deforestation in selected LMICs such as
China (18 %) [8], Zimbabwe (20 %) [10], Malawi
(26 %) [11] and Bangladesh (>30 %) [12].
The tobacco industry has claimed for decades that
concerns about tobacco-attributable deforestation are
based on misperception and myths, and it has been a
minor cause of the problem. The industry has also
been involved in mitigating activities in LMICs, not-
ably tree planting (forestation), development of more
efficient curing methods, and alternative fuels. By the
late 1990s, these efforts formed a core part of the
corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of sev-
eral transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). Today,
TTCs claim that tobacco-attributable deforestation is
being effectively addressed. In 2015, for instance, Brit-
ish American Tobacco (BAT) reported the planting of
over 170 million trees, and 94.8 % of wood used for
curing by its contracted farmers not coming from
natural forests [13]. Philip Morris International (PMI)
described its replenishing of forests and improving of
wood use efficiency [14], while Imperial Tobacco [15]
argues that its partnerships are “helping farmers to
become self-sufficient in wood”.This paper argues that there is a need to locate indus-
try claims within a fuller account of the deforestation
problem, and how the tobacco industry has sought to
shape environmental research and policy debates from
the 1970s to early 2000s. While tactics used by the
tobacco industry to influence health policy are well-
documented [16], there has been limited analysis of its
efforts to influence environmental policy. Bringing to-
gether how the industry has publicly framed deforest-
ation, with internal industry documents, this paper
describes the tactics used by the industry to shape the
definition of, and policy responses to, the problem of
tobacco-attributable deforestation. The findings raise
questions about the tobacco industry’s full impacts on
the environment, and its efforts to engage with envir-
onmental researchers and groups through its CSR
activities.
Background
Large-scale commercial tobacco farming dates from the
seventeenth century when expanding European demand
led to the establishment of plantations in the Americas
worked by African slaves. Over the next four centuries
booming demand, and the ability of the plant to grow in
most environments, saw tobacco farming spread world-
wide [17]. Tobacco production comprises three sectors:
growing and curing, leaf processing and manufacturing.
The first is the responsibility of farmers who must deal
with the “preparation of farms, nursery establishment,
planting, farm/crop management, harvesting, curing,
sorting and leaf grading, and transportation from their
homes to leaf buying centres” [18] (p. 5). Leaf processing
is dominated by large transnational companies, led by
Universal Leaf and Alliance One, and their subsidiaries.
Some large manufacturers also operate in tobacco
growing countries and purchase leaf directly from
farmers. In both cases, it is common that loans and
other inputs (e.g. seeds, fertilizers) are provided to
farmers under contract by the leaf purchaser up front,
who then purchases the ready-cured leaf at a pre
agreed price.
Leaf farming has shifted to LMICs since the 1960s, for
both domestic consumption and a cash crop, reaching
90 % of world production by 2008 [19]. In 2015 tobacco
was grown on 4.3 million hectares in 124 countries, pro-
ducing 7.5 million tonnes of leaf [20].
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sands of small farmers in LMICs are now dependent on
growing and curing tobacco for a global oligopoly of
processors and manufacturers. In Malawi following inde-
pendence in 1964, for example, development policies
favoured tobacco-growing estates, many controlled by
political elites [21]. Production more than quadrupled
from 1961 to 1979 [22] (Table 5.1). By 2004, tobacco
accounted for 70 % of exports [23] (p.274), 13 % of gross
domestic product (GDP), and 23 % of total tax base [24].
In 2009, tobacco employed 40 % of Malawi’s total work-
force [25]. Similarly, production more than doubled in
Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1998 [22] (Chapter 7), with
small-scale tobacco farms producing 50 % of agricultural
exports, 30 % of total exports and 10 % of gross domes-
tic product by 2003. In the Urambo district of Tanzania,
90 % of households surveyed were farmers who
depended on crop production as the sole source of in-
come, with 75 % of these farmers regular tobacco
growers [26].
Importantly, the control of leaf supply through the
contract system has led to “[s]teered overproduction…to
keep tobacco leaf prices low at the farm gate to the dis-
advantage of the tobacco farmers” [18] (p.7). Global leaf
production increased between 1970 and 1998 by almost
50 % [18] (p.7), while the real price of flue-cured leaf per
tonne fell by 37 % from 1985 to 2000 [23] (p.274). As
Otañez et al. write, the structure of leaf production
“restrict[s] competition, depress tobacco prices for
Malawi’s farmers and contribute to poverty in Malawi,
while keeping the country dependent on tobacco grow-
ing” [25] (p.261). Alongside the impoverishment of
smallholder farmers, and dependence of leaf exporting
countries on an increasingly globalized tobacco industry,
overproduction of tobacco leaf has created environmen-
tal impacts in the form of large-scale forest removal, soil
nutrient depletion, heavy use of pesticides and chemi-
cals, and intensive water and wood fuel usage [4]. It is in
this context that the tobacco industry’s efforts to shape
understanding of deforestation, caused by tobacco farm-
ing and curing since the 1970s, and the potential solu-
tions can be located.
Methods
We began by reviewing the existing scholarly literature
to understand how environmental scientists see the
problem of tobacco-attributable deforestation. We
searched the Environment Complete database using the
keywords “tobacco” and “*forestation”. We then exam-
ined company websites, reports, and industry publica-
tions (e.g. Tobacco Journal International, Tobacco
Reporter) to identify how the industry has publicly
framed the deforestation issue. Of particular interest
were industry views put forth on the impacts of theproblem, key causes, and industry responses. Materials
reviewed include annual reports, company statements,
public commentary, and news releases. To identify and
analyse industry strategies to shape understanding of de-
forestation caused by tobacco farming and curing, from
the 1970s when concerns began to be raised, the Truth
Tobacco Documents Library was systematically searched
between December 2014 and July 2015 using such key-
words as “*forestation”, “wood”, “fuel”, combined to-
gether using Boolean terms. A snowball method was
used to identify additional keywords generated from ini-
tial searches such as names of individuals, organizations,
projects and countries. The timeframe for this analysis is
limited by currently available documents which largely
date to the early 2000s. The above sources were com-
piled and triangulated, thematically and chronologically,
to derive a narrative of the industry strategy and activ-
ities related to deforestation.
Results
“Our significant common interests”: claiming economic
solidarity with tobacco farmers in the developing world
Tobacco-attributable deforestation first raised inter-
national concern at the 1979 World Conference on Smok-
ing and Health [27]. Attention was drawn by World
Health Organization [WHO] [28] to a study [29] reporting
that woodfuel curing requires one tree per 300 cigarettes.
To counter these concerns, the industry initiated a “pro-
active strategy” against “WHO’s propagandist views” fo-
cusing on “common interests” between the industry and
farmers [30]. This initially focused on the industry-funded
front group, International Committee on Tobacco Issues
(ICOSI), later renamed the International Tobacco Infor-
mation Centre (INFOTAB), which commissioned the
Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) to undertake “in-depth
studies…in Brazil, Costa Rica, Nigeria, India and Malaysia”
[31] (p. 1). The resultant report, Leaf tobacco - its contri-
bution to the economic and social development of the
Third World, then underpinned a “plan of action”, over-
seen by a newly created ICOSI Developing Countries
Group, to alert governments and “provoke reaction in the
Third World” [32]. TTCs were instructed by ICOSI to en-
sure “as many copies as possible reach people of influence
in government departments and the media” [33] (p. 1).
BAT informed its Territorial Coordinators, for example,
that the “TAC [Tobacco Advisory Council, the British
tobacco industry trade and lobbying group], [BAT]
Public Affairs Department and other UK manufac-
turers will be giving out a number of copies to influ-
ential people in Government and the media here in the
UK” [31] (p. 1). BAT described the report as providing “in-
formation not only to demonstrate the economic and so-
cial value of tobacco, but…to refute ill-considered WHO
policies damaging to the interests of developing countries”
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World Bank, IMF [International Monetary Fund] and
Western Countries’ Overseas Development Ministers are
fully aware of” the report [32] (p. 15).
At the same time, industry involvement in the research
was intentionally played down: “In accordance with
ICOSI policy, a low profile approach would be necessary,
probably through third parties” [32] (p. 15). ICOSI
Secretary General Julian Doyle described how questions
regarding independence were to be handled:
the industry provided support in terms of local liaison
facilities and certain financial assistance. “The industry”
in that context was the member companies of ICOSI
and, if questioned on their role, they will be stating that
they commissioned the study. I believe that this study,
undertaken by a research organization second to none
in international reputation for objective high quality
work, will provide valid evidence of the industry’s very
real contribution to economic and social development
in the Third World. [34] (pp. 1–2)
The public relations firm Hill and Knowlton also rec-
ommended that the “independence” of the report be
emphasized: “The EIU Study offers the best - yet inde-
pendent evidence that tobacco growing is of great bene-
fit and financial importance to underdeveloped regions
of the world” [35].
Building on the 1980 report, and ahead of the 1983
World Conference on Smoking and Health, INFOTAB
commissioned The Role of Tobacco and Comparable
Cash Crops in Rural Development in Selected Low
Income Countries by J.P. McInerney at the Centre for
Agricultural Strategy, University of Reading. The pur-
pose of the review was “to establish the economic con-
tribution of….tobacco and its alternatives in the farming
systems of small producers with the implications for in-
come, employment and other parameters of rural devel-
opment” [36]. Head of BAT Public Affairs Department
Robert Ely wrote to colleagues that “Dr Burley and Mr S
Rossides of EIU were mentioned as contacts for the
Reading team should they wish to get in touch. A full
copy of the EIU 1979 Paper would be sent to the Read-
ing team together with any other material including eco-
nomic impact studies which might be available” [37].
PM President Hamish Maxwell described the Reading
study as a way of extending the industry’s “circle of
allies” to “new constituencies”, advising that “[w]e must
continue to build up in the professional literature a res-
ervoir of credible articles like his which the industry can
cite in defense of tobacco as a major contributor to
cash-crop economies” [38] (pp. 12–15).
The industry began to lobby officials at the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) soon after, using theEIU and Reading studies, facilitated by former UN offi-
cial turned industry consultant Niki Hauser. According
to Mercer, the industry “knew that the World Health
Organisation exerted…a significant pressure on FAO to
support its anti-smoking campaigns” [39] (p.3). In a draft
speech to ministers of agriculture, he described his
strategy:
We believed that the Permanent Representatives of
tobacco growing countries would have strong feelings
in defence of their tobacco industry in view of the
valuable social and economic benefits which it brings
to their countries and that they might discuss the
presentation with their ministers [39] (p. 3).
As part of ‘Project Hauser’ [40] McInerney presented
his findings in May 1983, comprising one of “two separ-
ate and independent studies” [41] (p.2), to “senior mem-
bers of the FAO and…selected delegates to the FAO
from developing countries”.1 The presentation stressed
the “significant interests to the economy” from “small
farmer” employment, export profits, import substitution
and tax revenues. The studies were cited as evidence of
BAT
playing a positive and substantial role in developing
agricultural skills and experience in the developing
world. In almost every country in which tobacco is
grown and in which BAT has a presence, there is
close co-operation and partnership between BAT
companies and governments, the farmers and local
communities. [42] (p.6)
Dissemination of the studies coincided with the 1983
World Conference on Smoking and Health where indus-
try delegates reported “the anti-smoking movement had
come of age” and “many more third world delegates
were present” [43]. The conference addressed “the eco-
nomic theme…in Third World countries”, including a
presentation by John Madeley on deforestation in Kenya
caused by tobacco farming [44]. It was reported that the
paper “created a wave of concern in the international to-
bacco control community” [45] (p. 191), and elicited a
recommendation by delegates that “U.N. agencies must
cease supporting tobacco growing and examine deforest-
ation problem” [46].
Despite these growing concerns, however, “a 10-year
drought of information on…deforestation caused by
tobacco growing and curing in developing countries”
ensued, according to Tobacco Control editor Simon
Chapman [45] (p. 191), during which industry lobby-
ing at FAO continued. The industry pointed to the
“lack of research” by tobacco control advocates, and
criticised WHO’s “emotional and contradictory…attacks”
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McInerney’s proposal to follow up the desk review with a
“properly structured field survey work in key cash crop
areas…[with] statistically based results (rather than just
anecdotal evidence)” [48]. Ely responded he was “not sure
that there would be too much to be gained from it” [49].
Instead, industry efforts were channeled into the
development of a “‘pro-active’ EIU follow up strategy”
that would “provide the data needed to refute ill-
considered WHO policies damaging to the interests of
developing countries” [30] (p. 1). Documents suggest a
key part of this strategy was the creation by TTCs of the
International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) in
1984. While the ITGA publicly describes itself as a
“non-profit organization…presenting the cause of mil-
lions of tobacco farmers to the world” [50], documents
show TTCs colluded through the ITGA to “‘front’…our
Third World lobby activities at the World Health
Organisation, and gain support from nations hostile to
multinational corporations” [51]. The ITGA would later
play a central role in promoting industry-funded re-
search which downplayed responsibility for deforestation
and countered findings from independent research.
“True causes of deforestation”: downplaying tobacco
industry responsibility
Documents suggest that a second tactic of the industry
is to attribute deforestation to “many causes” [52] which
are far more to blame than tobacco. Recognising the
limitations of “denial without documentation” [53],
the industry then funded new research, disseminated
through front groups, to shape the policy debate. In
1984 Ely [54] commissioned Alistair Fraser, of the
International Forest Sciences Consultancy (IFSC), to
study the impact of tobacco growing and curing on
deforestation. Fraser’s draft report, The Ecological, Social
and Economic Implications of the Use of Wood by the
Tobacco Industry [55], found the impact ranged from
none in Argentina to “an important influence” in Malawi.
The reported concluded that, “[i]n all the countries
studied, the forest resources have been depleted to such
an extent that the annual cut of woodfuel appears to ex-
ceed the growth in the forest, and forest destruction is tak-
ing place, both, through obvious clearance and by the
more pernicious overcutting” [55] (p. 47). The study
recommended
the tobacco industry assess the true economic cost
of the fuel needed for flue-curing the tobacco,
taking account of the opportunity cost of the land
needed to grow woodfuel, and the foreign exchange
implications of using fossil fuels, and develop local
long-term strategies to ensure the most economic
long-term fuel supply. [55] (p. 47)Upon submitting this draft, Fraser wrote that “the
major part” of his report was “complete,” barring “a
short concluding section and bibliography…and possibly
some editorial improvements” [56].
However, Fraser’s findings immediately raised con-
cerns among BAT senior staff. Fraser’s “desk research”
[57] was considered to contain “data conflicting sharply
with” industry sources [58]. Similarly, J. Drummond
(BAT Manager of Leaf Department) wrote to Ely:
I am somewhat surprised at the direction Dr. Fraser’s
investigations have taken in Thailand….Fraser has
made certain suggestions as to future actions. I would
be very, very reluctant to support these….we are in a
potential mine field and if we were to take up Fraser’s
suggestions without a full study of their wider
implications….[59].
Despite a FAO report containing data “very close
to the ones quoted in my Report”, Fraser agreed to
meet with Ely in November 1984 to discuss his
estimates of “the quantities of wood-fuel use in
flue-curing” [60]. After this meeting, Fraser wrote:
“I am very happy to take on board your comments
and the additional information which has come to
light since submitting the report” [61] (p. 2). The
“additional information” proved to be data from
local BAT companies [62] “for his consideration”
reporting far lower levels of woodfuel use [57].
It was agreed that this new data would be used, funded
or provided by the industry, with the methodology ap-
proved by BAT [63] including “field work” in case-study
countries [64, 65] and “informal approaches to other to-
bacco curers” [61]. Despite this close industry’s involve-
ment, the study was described by Ely as an “independent
survey done on the use of wood fuel for curing tobacco
as compared with other fuel and indeed other uses of
wood based products” [66] (p. 2).
The revised report, entitled The use of wood by the
tobacco industry and the ecological implications, revised
downward the original finding that “the amount of wood
used in flue-curing around the world may be as high
as…4.5 % of all woodfuel consumed,” to “less than 1 %
of all wood consumption” and “only 0.7 % of all fuel-
wood consumed” in the case study countries [52]. Fraser
was invited to present these findings to an INFOTAB
meeting where the evidence was said to show the indus-
try was contributing to deforestation “to a very minor
degree” [67] (p. 4). Attendees agreed to submit an article
to the Courier (published by the European Commission),
with copies to FAO and World Bank, based on these
findings. Fraser was also to speak to Tanzanian officials
as part of Hauser’s lobbying efforts.
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publication of an 1989 article, “Tobacco: the burning
issue” by the UN Department of Information. Douglas
Wholey (consultancy firm Minster Agriculture) wrote to
Ely describing it as “a very serious affair as the publica-
tion is very widely circulated and unfortunately is
respected in development circles” [68]. In response, the
ITGA published an editorial in its in-house journal,
Tobacco Forum, which stated:
A lot of nonsense is promulgated about the use
of wood by tobacco farmers. Typical of such
misinformation, an article published in the UN
Department of Information’s ‘Development Forum’…
claimed that ‘perhaps one out of every eight trees
worldwide is used for curing tobacco’. The fact is that
the tobacco industry as a whole accounts for
significantly less than 1 % of all wood consumed in
the developing world, not all of which is used for
curing. The tobacco industry is only one of many
industries which use wood as fuel [69] (p. 1).
Fraser also wrote to the Development Forum editor
challenging the article’s claims:
In 1986 we were invited to carry out a totally
independant [sic] survey of the use of wood by the
tobacco industry….the tobacco industry accounts for
rather less than 1 % of all wood consumed in the
developing world, rather than the 12 % implied by the
one tree in eight in your article. It does harm to the
credibility of the U.N. system when such articles are
published which do not indicate the sources of the
information, and which are not based on the scientific
data which is available [70] (p. 1–2).
Sending a copy of Fraser’s letter to Wholey, Ely
wrote: “hope you will agree with me that it is a very
complete answer. However, in case it is not published
we will have to take fresh steps to cope with the situ-
ation” [71]. This included the ITGA inviting leaf
growers to “place Tobacco Forum in appropriate
hands within your country. For example, with local
newspapers/magazines, opinion-formers, relevant gov-
ernment officials” [72]. This was followed in 1990 by
the ITGA publishing an atlas on leaf growing, To-
bacco in the Developing World, “to convince First
World governments and UN agencies that their anti-
tobacco campaigns are bad news for the developing
countries that grow tobacco” [73]. The atlas was up-
dated and re-issued several times over the next dec-
ade. TTCs were, in turn, advised to use ITGA
publications to downplay industry responsibility. For
BAT, for example, the advised model response was:The tobacco industry does not use rain forests to cure
tobacco and does not grow tobacco in rain forest
areas because the climate is not suitable. In other
areas it is BAT policy not to clear forestry land. Only
land already cleared and being used for agriculture is
considered for use [74] (p. 1).
Over the next decade, frequent referral to Fraser’s
“independent study” [75] was made to dispel “woodfuel
myths” [76] (p. 3), using “objective third party data” [77],
and to draw proper attention to the “true causes of
deforestation” [78] (p. 28), namely “population growth,
non-sustainable agricultural practices and lack of afford-
able alternative fuels” [79].
By the early 1990s, non-industry funded research
began to report alarming rates of deforestation in Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda. Funded by the Panos Institute,
launched at the 1993 All Africa Conference on Tobacco
and Health, and published in Tobacco Control, a case
study of two regions in Tanzania found tobacco “had
turned the area into an environmental disaster” [80]
(p. 252). In Uganda’s West Nile region, which pro-
duces 80 % of the country’s tobacco, natural forest
cover was reduced from 7225 to 3000 ha. Up to
130 kg of woodfuel was being used to cure 1 kg of
tobacco [81]. In Kenya, indigenous trees were “severely
reduced in numbers” from expanded tobacco growing
[82] (p. 249).
These renewed concerns were initially dismissed as
opportunism by public health advocates “seeking to take
advantage of” the 1992 UN Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) [83] (p. 3). As new evi-
dence emerged, however, the industry took a more
strategic approach. The consultancy Agro-Tobacco
Services (ATS) was formed in 1992, with £426,000
from six tobacco companies (BAT, PM, RJ Reynolds,
Rothmans International, Gallaher and Reemtsma), along
with “international leaf dealers, state-controlled tobacco
manufacturers, and other tobacco interests” [84] (p. 12).
Headed by ITGA Assistant Secretary General Martin
Oldman, ATS’s role was to “develop and implement action
plans for each of the ITGA member organizations,
develop new argumentation, and liaise with external
allies” [85]. Ahead of the 1993 All Africa Conference,
a briefing paper was developed “for placement before
and/or during the Conference”, aimed at “rebalancing
some misconceptions regarding tobacco and wood
use” [86] (p. 1). To counter publication of Tobacco:
The Smoke blows South by the Panos Institute [87],
updating the report on Uganda [88], Oldman pub-
lished Developing Countries and Tobacco as “a critical
analysis” which “ITGA/Agro-Tobacco Services could
usefully deploy 500 copies” [89] (p.1). The report de-
scribed the principal author of the Panos report, John
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[who] makes a wide range of very predictable claims
against the tobacco industry.” In contrast, despite be-
ing a longstanding ITGA employee, Oldman is de-
scribed as an “independent consultant specialising in
tobacco-attributable issues in the developing world”
using “independently published sources” [89] (p. 4).
Forestation as “an important PR tool for marketing the
Corporate Brand”
A third key tactic of the tobacco industry, to counter
deforestation concerns, was involvement in, and even
leadership of, forestation efforts (reforestation and affor-
estation). The industry rejected the “rash of stories con-
demning transnational tobacco company activities in
developing nations” [90] (p. 2), instead blaming lack of
government action for deforestation:
Where Third World governments have generally
encouraged the development of tobacco, their forestry
departments have often been slow to recognize the
need for reforestation. Tobacco companies have,
therefore, taken the initiative, encouraging farmers to
plant trees either individually or on a cooperative
basis, even providing free seedlings for both depleted
forestland and new land [90] (p. 12–13).
This portrayal of the industry as responsible corporate
citizen was supported by the initiation of forestation
projects in several countries including Nigeria [91], the
Philippines [92], and Sri Lanka [93]. In the Dominican
Republic, PM’s “Institutional Reforestation Campaign”
was featured on television, newspaper advertisements,
posters and t-shirts [94] (p. 38). In Brazil, BAT sub-
sidiary Souza Cruz claimed to have replanted by 1984
“much more than the total amount of wood needed
for every crop….forests have been increasing instead
of diminishing” [95] (p. 2). The claimed success of
BAT’s program in Kenya led the Tanzanian Permanent
Representative to the UN in Geneva to request “human
and financial resources…for an afforestation program” to-
wards “arresting or minimising the environmental degrad-
ation that tobacco growing causes in developing
countries” [96] (p. 1).
Over the next decade, there was little scrutiny and no
independent research to counter industry forestation
claims. One exception was a 1984 report by Madeley
which argued that BAT’s reforestation plans in Kenya
were “going very badly”. He reported that land growing
tobacco was five times more than for trees. Around 12
million trees were cut annually for curing, causing
desertification, displacement of food crops and woodfuel
shortages [44] (p.2). Into this vacuum BAT “began to
make use of” a commissioned study [97], againpresented as an “independent audit”, by Moi University
“to demonstrate BAT Kenya’s contribution” [98] (p. 2). It
was not until the mid 1990s that hard questions about
the effectiveness of industry-led forestation projects were
raised. For example, Kweyuh observed that afforestation
“largely failed to achieve the desired effect” [82] (p. 249).
In Tanzania, Waluye observed that “very few trees are
planted annually compared to those cut down” [80]
(p.253). In 1993, the Panos Institute reported:
In Kenya…BAT says that farmers can only become
tobacco farmers if they agree to plant 1000
eucalyptus trees a year on their land. But there are
problems. The average smallholder in Kenya has
less than 4 ha of land. If he or she plants tobacco,
that might take up half a hectare and the trees a
further hectare. Land for food and other purposes
is squeezed….[A] former senior employee of BAT
Kenya alleged: “the company is shouting about
massive tree planting but this I’m afraid is nothing
less than an outrageous attempt to veil the whole
problem” [87] (p. 11).
To counter these criticisms, the ITGA showcased “18
countries running afforestation programmes PR [public
relations]” for BAT [99] (p. 1). BAT claimed it “helped to
plant more trees than are used to cure the tobacco it
buys….over 100 million surviving trees…forecast to in-
crease to 152 million trees by 1995” [100] (p. 2). More-
over, “no farmer will be recruited to grow tobacco for
BAT unless he/she has satisfied the minimum re-
quirements for trees” [101]. The programmes would
“provide enough woodfuel for…contracted farmers to
be 26 % self sufficient” [100] (p. 2), rising to 53 % by
1995 [99] (p.1) and 81.9 % by 2000 [102] (p. 25). In
this way, it was expected that BAT could use the
claim of “close to a ‘carbon balance’ in its operations” as
“an important PR tool for marketing the Corporate Brand”
[102] (p. 4). Documents describe BAT making afforest-
ation one of its “global flagship CSR programmes” in 1999
as “an area of frequent attacks against us by pressure
groups” [103] (p. 4). An Afforestation Team was formed,
working closely with the EarthWatch Institute as “a mem-
ber of the project team” [103] (p. 5). In 1999 BAT hosted
Afforestation Week in Uganda [104], and was keen to
“exploit our good efforts” by sending “the head of
‘Earthwatch’ to take a look” [105] (p. 1). Following a
similar visit to Ghana, EarthWatch African Programme
Manager Lucy Beresford-Stooke wrote, “BAT appear to be
actively facing environmental issues” [106] (p.2).
Internally, however, BAT staff expressed concerns.
While the ITGA publicly stated that “the wood deficit
[in Zimbabwe] is not so serious and alternative fuels are
available” [107], Parirewa of BAT Zimbabwe admitted,
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attention given to the woodlots is poor. Nonetheless,
British American Tobacco Zimbabwe must be seen to
be concerned about the depletion of forests although
it has no direct link with tobacco growers who are
considered the main “culprits’ in the cutting down of
trees [108] (p.1).
In Pakistan and Nigeria, it was acknowledged that ef-
forts “will fall well short of the afforestation policy target
of self-sufficiency in wood-fuel usage by 2000”, and there
was “need to introduce urgent corrective action” [102]
(p. 4). In 2001 preservation of natural forests became
part of its “Sustainable agriculture and farmer liveli-
hoods” initiative and Biodiversity Partnership with the
Earthwatch Institute, Fauna & Flora International, the
Tropical Biology Association [109]. Since the late 1990s,
non industry-funded studies confirmed the alarming
situation [110]. A 1999 study by University of Düsseldorf
geographer Helmut Geist found the industry caused
4.6 % of deforestation in developing countries and 12 %
in southern Africa [8, 111]. Geist’s findings were widely
cited including in the report Golden Leaf, Barren
Harvest:
[D]espite government recommendations to have
10 % of farm land planted with trees, studies by
the Extension Service of Malawi found that 80 % of
estate farmers had failed to follow this advice. In
Tanzania’s Southern Songea highlands, where most
tobacco is fire-cured, Geist found that a mere
1.4 % of the overall farmland of tobacco growers
was planted with trees, as opposed to the officially
mandated 20 % [112] (p. 26).
Samson Mwita Marwa, a Kenyan tobacco farmer and
former Member of Parliament, observed: “BAT claims to
be engaged in reforestation programmes. I have yet to
see a single mature tree that BAT has planted in Kuria
district….the rate of deforestation is far too fast to be
equal to the rate of reforestation” [113] (p. 2). Bates
et al. reported that
In Uganda, BAT has been planting the fast growing
eucalyptus trees to replace depleted indigenous species
like the shea butter tree whose oil is used in cooking in
many parts of Northern Uganda. The eucalyptus is an
anti-social thirsty tree. Its fast growth rate places a great
demand on the soil water and nutrients, while its fallen
leaves contain chemicals that discourage the growth of
other vegetation near the tree [114] (p. 3).
Sauer and Abdallah found 69 % of tobacco farmers in
the Urambo District, Tanzania clear new woodlands forcultivation every season, because virgin land offers
fewer soil-borne diseases and higher yields, with 25 %
using the same plot for two consecutive seasons
[115]. WHO concluded that “[r]eforestation pro-
grammes cosponsored and promoted by the tobacco
industry are not enough to reverse the damage” [113]
(p. 2). Kweyuh argued that the “Industry should be
forced to withdraw all phony statistics and research
and to finance state and NGO initiatives to address
the deforestation” [116].
With this accumulating evidence, TTCs began to
publicly acknowledged the severity of the problem. A
2012 BAT-commissioned review concluded that defor-
estation “may be the single most negative impact of
tobacco cultivation on the environment” [117] (p. 6).
The report found that the “‘continuous reduction’ of
wood use in curing green leaf tobacco, as claimed in
industry commissioned works such as those of Fraser
[52] and Campbell [75], can very likely not be sub-
stantiated given the results of the study by Geist
et al. [111]” [117] (p. 12). Today BAT admits that
“[l]oss of natural forests is one of the most significant
environmental impacts linked to tobacco growing,
due to wood often being used as a fuel in curing pro-
cesses” [118]. Similarly PM reports that “tobacco
farming has contributed to extensive depletion of
[Malawi’s]…trees due to the use of large quantities of
wood in traditional tobacco curing process” [119].
Japan Tobacco International (JTI) recognises:
[I]n Malawi, forest cover has more than halved over
the last four decades, creating fears about the
sustainability of wood as a resource. This has
significant consequences for the lifestyles and
livelihoods of the farmers JTI works with. Without
a ready supply of wood they are less able to
sustain their way of living and produce the high
volume of quality tobacco that both they and JTI
need [120].
Alliance One International, a leaf merchant in more
than 45 countries, notes: “The lush forests that once
spread across Kenya’s landscape are now vanishing
at an alarming rate. While environmental impacts
of deforestation border upon dismal, the lack of
trees also threatens the entire country with drought”
[121].
Discussion
To date, analyses of efforts by the tobacco industry to
influence research and policy have been largely focused
on public health issues. We demonstrate in this paper
that tobacco industry efforts to influence public policy
extend to the environment sector.
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sought to shape understanding of the deforestation
problem, caused by tobacco farming and curing, from
the 1970s to early 2000s centred on claims of economic
benefits [122], alternative causes of tobacco-related dis-
eases [123]; and responsible behaviour towards con-
sumers and communities [124]. These arguments were
advanced through lobbying at the national and inter-
national levels, collusion through the use of front groups
[125], and industry commissioned research by paid con-
sultants [16, 126]. These are all well-documented tactics,
used by the industry to prevent or delay regulation on
other tobacco control issues, although to date analysed
to a limited extent in relation to environmental issues.
The effectiveness of efforts to downplay tobacco-
attributable deforestation, against claims of economic
benefits to farmers and LMIC governments, was enabled
by the latter’s contractual dependence on global markets
controlled by large leaf processing and manufacturing
oligopolies. The blame placed on local communities and
national governments shifted attention away from their
subsistence-level dependence, “steered overproduction”,
and lack of alternative fuel sources and livelihoods. The
claims that industry-led forestation initiatives effectively
addressed the problem left primary responsibility to
smallholder farmers incapable of growing sufficient trees
to compensate for the scale of deforestation. This shaping
of the deforestation issue was underpinned by commis-
sioned research whose findings were altered to suit indus-
try interests. From the 1970s onwards, this “independent
research” was disseminated to senior UN and government
officials by front groups and paid consultants. The overall
aim, as described by PM, was “to manage and mitigate pu-
nitive regulatory measures, enhance the corporate image,
[and] influence public policy” [127].
The lack of effective action to address tobacco-
attributable deforestation, and indeed prevent escalation
of the problem [8, 115], can be understood in this con-
text. Along with insufficient national responses, inter-
national policies encouraged the expansion of global leaf
production. World Bank financing supported tobacco
growing until 1991. Trade agreements, such as the
Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the European
Union and LMICs, created favourable terms for tobacco
exports. As Otanez et al. explain,
The trade policies that reflect the interests
of developed countries and corporations in the
current global economic system contribute to
poverty in Malawi and other developing
countries because these countries produce
commodities for export markets instead of food
for their own consumption, and depend on costly
agricultural chemicals that pollute water supplies,erode soils and contribute to deforestation [25] (p.
262).
These findings have important implications for under-
standing the role of the tobacco industry in environmen-
tal policy. First, there is a need to more fully measure
the diverse environmental consequences of the tobacco
industry over time. Tobacco-attributable deforestation
warrants the urgent collection of systematic data across
time and place by independent scientists. Other environ-
mental impacts include agrochemical pollution [128],
loss of biodiversity [129], air pollution [130] and waste
toxicity [131]. The limited and fragmented nature of
available data since the 1980s enables the industry to
continue to downplay its environmental impacts and
offer industry-serving solutions.
Second, the above findings suggest that the involvement
of some environmental scientists and groups played an
important role in the industry’s tactics, by lending support
to perceptions that industry-commissioned research and
policy initiatives are scientifically-based and credible. As
described by McDaniel and Malone, it is important that
environmental groups be aware of how they provide
legitimacy and help redeem the industry’s negative
public reputation [132]. These links with environmen-
tal groups can also provide an entrée for the tobacco
industry into civil society and CSR, thus avoiding
direct responsibility for the environmental conse-
quences of the industry.
Third, environmental policy research has understand-
ably given growing attention to the political power of
the business sector [133], focusing on industries such as
oil and gas [134] and agrochemicals [135]. Scrutiny of
the tobacco industry has traditionally come from the
public health community. These findings demonstrate
the need for the environmental community to include
the tobacco industry in efforts to improve the transpar-
ency and accountability of corporations.
Conclusions
Deforestation remains a serious global environmental
challenge. Available evidence suggests tobacco farming
and curing, to produce a product that kills 6 million
people annually, accounts for 4 % of deforestation glo-
bally, and 18–30 % in some LMICs. There have been
limited efforts to date to address tobacco-attributable
deforestation as a problem, led by CSR initiatives by the
industry. The findings of this paper suggest that this is
due, in part, to the tobacco industry shaping under-
standing of the deforestation problem, and potential so-
lutions to address it, in ways that sustain the interests of
the industry. There is an urgent need for independent
measurement and monitoring of the problem, particularly
in high production LMICs, and a range of policy measures
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powerful global leaf processors and manufacturers.
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